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Abstract  
In Senegal, considerable development assistance has been allocated to addressing the problem of repeated flooding in 
urban areas, involving changing thematic objectives, from short-term disaster relief to wide-ranging sanitation and 
drainage programmes. In spite of these numerous flood management interventions, the number of flood victims in 
Senegal’s urban centres has increased steadily since 1999. This article contributes empirically and conceptually to 
recent studies highlighting poor national disaster risk-management frameworks in West Africa, by investigating how 
floods have been managed in Senegal and why this management has not led to the results expected by the population. 
The article finds that the configuration of flood management policies and programmes in urban Senegal points towards 
three key intertwined issues which have influenced the limited achievements of flood management in urban areas. 
These include, but are not restricted to, the political and personal appropriation of flood management-related processes, 
the reinforcement of the dichotomy between central government and municipalities, and a fragmented institutional 
framework with overlapping institutions.          
                       
KEYWORDS: Disaster risk management, climate change adaptation, actor-oriented approach, 
planned interventions, flood management policies, peri-urban areas, Senegal.   
  
1. Introduction   
Since 1999, seasonal floods have become prevalent to the extent that the rainy season has been 
renamed the flooding season by the residents of poor peri-urban areas on the outskirts of Dakar, 
Senegal. This situation is characteristic of many countries in West Africa, where entire 
neighbourhoods on the outskirts of cities are almost annually paralyzed by massive flooding, a 
situation which is due to uncontrolled urban growth, poor urban planning and inadequate 
stormwater drainage systems, and which is expected to be exacerbated by climate change (World 
Bank and GFDRR, 2011). Evidence from the region suggests a situation of ineffective national 
responses with respect to disaster risk management and responses to flooding (Rakhi et al., 2008). 
Although governmental authorities are usually expected to assume full responsibility for disasters 
and individual safety (Paton and Johnston, 2004), there is an emerging perception that they cannot 
avert all disasters or protect people from all of their consequences (Maguire and Hagan, 2007), 
especially in developing countries where numerous actors are involved in disaster risk management 
because of limited financial resources, technical expertise and/or technological capabilities,. 
Disaster risk management is part of Senegal's Poverty Reduction Strategy, and the country is a 
signatory to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which until recently has constituted the 
overarching international policy framework that has brought governments, international 
development agencies, experts and NGOs into a common system of coordination to reduce 
disaster risks and increase resilience to hazards. It was replaced in March 2015 by the Sendai 
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Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030). In contrast to many other West African 
countries, flood mitigation and adaptation initiatives in Senegal have multiplied over the last fifteen 
years, being led by the government with support from bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and 
NGOs. However, in spite of considerable donor and government funding allocated to addressing 
the problem of seasonal flooding in urban areas, few sustainable solutions have been proposed 
thus far. Instead, the number of flood victims in Senegal’s urban centres increased steadily from 
170,000 in 1999 to 900,000 in 2009 (Senegal, 2010). Most of these victims live in peri-urban areas 
at the periphery of Dakar (Pikine and Guédiawaye, see map 1), which are characterized by slums 
and inadequate critical infrastructure and state services, such as waste management, sanitation and 
water (Diouf, 2009). The last fifteen years, floods have recurred almost yearly in these zones with 
varying durations and impacts, such as the disruption of income generating activities, family 
fragmentation, death, negative health impacts (such as diarrheal disease, wound infections and 
Malaria) and the destruction of houses and infrastructure (Schaer and Hahonou, forthcoming). As 
a result, inhabitants who are mainly un- or underemployed, see their already significant 
vulnerability severely increased for every new flood event. They are repeatedly forced to apply 
short term strategies to cope with, and adapt to this situation, which are often maladaptive and 
thus make them even more vulnerable to future flood events in the long term (Schaer 2015). The 
underlying causes of urban flooding in the peri-urban areas outside Dakar are complex and consist 
of a combination of natural as well as human factors (Mbow et al. 2008), including uncontrolled 
urban growth1, which reduced the permeability of ground surfaces and increased run-off rates, the 
increase in rainfall, non-existent rainwater drainage and rising groundwater levels.   
  
Map 1. Location of peri-urban areas of Dakar: Guédiawaye and Pikine, source: author  
The presence of many donors and international aid agencies in the country and the abundance of 
funds allocated to flood responses have created complex national flood management processes 
attracting a wide array of competing actors and institutions. These are directly and indirectly 
                                                 
1 Uncontrolled urbanization was a result of an administrative decision to evict residents of Dakar city centre’s irregular 
neighbourhoods (Thoré, 1962) and extensive and uncontrolled rural–urban migration, resulting from extensive 
droughts of the 1970s, when, because of deteriorating climate and soil conditions for agriculture, rural populations 
were forced to pursue alternative livelihoods (Fall et al. 2005). As urban sprawl grew beyond the control of the 
authorities, poor populations had no other alternative than to settle in hazard-prone lowlands.  
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involved in flood related interventions through a multitude of diverse projects and programmes 
aimed at flood risk reduction, disaster relief, recovery and long-term climate adaptation.   
  
Analysis of national disaster risk management in West Africa has mainly been driven by multilateral 
and bilateral aid agencies. In Senegal, numerous analyses of the causes, impacts, needs and costs 
of flooding have been undertaken over the last seven years by both bilateral and multilateral 
agencies (GFDRR et al., 2014; UNISDR, 2013; Government of Senegal and World Bank, 2013; 
UNESCO, 2011; World Bank and GFDRR, 2011; Government of Senegal, World Bank et al., 
2010; World Bank and IAGU, 2009; UNISDR et al., 2008). A number of these reports typically 
identify ‘gaps’ in the flood management policies that are being pursued nationally, also 
recommending actions to remedy the current failures to address the problem of recurrent flooding. 
However, due to their objectives of proposing new actions and interventions, they generally do 
not go into much detail in seeking to understand the underlying constructed and negotiated 
currents of influence over the configuration of flood management interventions in the country.   
  
There is a body of academic literature addressing weak institutions and failures in disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CAA) governance in developing countries 
(Agrawal et al., 2008; Adger, 2000; Fatti and Patel, 2013; Lindell, 2008; Yaro et al., 2014; Kern and 
Alber, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2011).  There is another body of literature scrutinizing the practices 
behind the flood management approaches adopted in the West African region (see Bang, 2014; 
Thiam, 2013; Thiam, 2011, Diagne and Ndiaye, 2009), as well as some research analysing the 
implications of decentralisation for public service delivery in Senegal (Resnick, 2014a; Resnick, 
2014b), but there has so far been no research which critically investigates the interplay between 
various development actors and state institutions, or which tries to understand how this interplay 
shapes institutions, policies and outcomes in relation to flood management.   
  
To contribute to filling this research gap, this article aims to answer the following research 
questions: How have urban floods been managed in Senegal and why has this management not 
led to the results expected by the population?   
  
The analytical framework is outlined in section 2, followed by the methodology adopted in section 
3. A chronological empirical account of the flood management policies and interventions adopted 
is outlined in section 4, followed by a discussion of the unintended consequences of this 
configuration in section 5. A brief conclusion is provided in section 6.  
  
 
 
 
4  
  
 
 
2. Analytical framework  
2.1 Conceptualizing flood management interventions   
The approach followed in this article departs from the view of the state as a unified source of 
intentions, policies and coherent plans: instead the state is viewed as a set of complex social and 
negotiating processes among various actors and groups (Blundo and Le Meur, 2009), where donor 
interventions play a preponderant and overlapping role in state interventions. This perspective is 
based on elements from the anthropology of public spaces and the public action literature (Olivier 
de Sardan 2008; Lund 2007; Migdal 2001; Migdal and Schlichte 2005; Blundo and Le Meur 2009), 
which considers both public policy interventions and interventions by development institutions as 
the same object of study. These interventions are today intertwined to the extent that a separation 
line between external aid and 'endogenous' resources is now seen as futile (Bierschenk and de 
Sardan, 2014). As a result, the term 'intervention' is used here as an umbrella term encompassing 
projects and programmes engaged by, and involving, both government and development 
institutions (bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and NGOs). The article adopts a broad approach 
to flood management interventions in Senegal. These include programmes and projects of diverse 
scope (from food aid distribution in a flooded neighbourhood to the development of drainage 
master plans) and at different temporal scales of a flood event, ranging from hazard mitigation and 
preparedness (i.e. early-warning systems), via acute relief (i.e. shelter and food aid), community 
recovery and reconstruction (i.e. new housing and drainage systems) to long-term climate 
adaptation (i.e. development of sanitation systems and municipal capacity building).    
  
2.2 Flood management interventions as arenas for struggle and negotiated processes    
Since public authority is no longer considered to be solely the capacity of the state and is exercised 
and influenced by diverse actors, including donors, it may take many different forms, which may 
sometimes function in agreement and sometimes in competition or direct conflict (Lund, 2006). 
External aid is thereby mediated and modelled differently by these actors and the structures in 
which they operate (Long, 2001). Central to this line of thought is a critical view of the linear and 
rational thinking behind the ideal-type donor intervention, exemplified by the logical framework 
approach, according to which problems can be identified, followed by appropriate actions, leading 
in turn to predictable outcomes (Mosse, 2004). Instead, consistent with the actor-oriented 
perspective applied here, development interventions are regarded as being part of ongoing socially 
constructed and negotiated processes (Long and Ploeg, 1989), where actors exercise various forms 
of influence and hold diverging interests and conflicting motives (Bierschenk, 1988), and where 
the unintended consequences are often more important than the intended ones (Ferguson, 1994). 
A central element to the analytical framework applied here is therefore the assumption that the 
constant social and political struggles that occur between actors involved in interventions create 
new arenas for struggle over issues, resources, values and representations (Olivier de Sardan, 2005). 
In this article, arenas are therefore considered to be places of confrontation between actors over a 
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shared issue, where they mobilise social relations and deploy diverse methods to obtain specific 
ends. Arenas do not thereby necessarily occur in distinctly demarcated settings, but may take place 
at different temporal scales and may therefore emerge between geographically distant actors, 
contexts and institutional structures (Long, 2001). In Senegal, the main actors involved in policy 
and intervention processes are thus involved in coexisting arenas around flood management, for 
example, to access municipal flood response funding, to attract disaster risk management and 
climate adaptation resources to the country, to influence the direction of policy and to encourage 
popular support to political parties.   
  
The existence of these diverse arenas suggests that interventions are instrumentalized by actors to 
serve diverse interests (such as strengthening professional positions and personal networks, 
satisfying donor country constituents, political power and private gain) through ongoing 
competition for different symbolic and material resources. Interventions are thereby shaped by a 
variety of actors who compete over the opportunities made available, where power is used and 
mobilized according to their various intentionalities (Gramming, 2002). They are all in possession 
of diverse mandates and resources and operate within distinct structural constraints, according to 
particular social logics, which together define their unequal positions of influence and thereby their 
room for manoeuvre within the arenas in which they operate. All arenas are highly inter-connected, 
these inter-connections being manifested differently, according to the situation in question. This 
conveys the need to consider the forms of interaction between the actors involved, their respective 
reasoning, their hidden agendas and the practical strategies adopted (Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan, 1997). Since as objects of enquiry arenas have spatial, social and temporal dimensions, a 
key challenge is to trace where they are situated, who has access to them and how they occur. This 
perspective allows us to gain insight into the ‘multiple realities’ that influence the different 
interpretations of flood management interventions, where different meanings are attributed to 
interventions by diverse groups of actors. Consequently, the analytical concept of the arena is 
found to be particularly appropriate for the purposes of this paper because it marks the 
understanding of the flood management intervention processes followed in Senegal as political 
and social in nature, with actors using the opportunities created by interventions to serve their own 
interests and priorities. The approach followed in this paper considers mainly actor interests at the 
level of larger group logics (Long, 2001), rather than at the individual level. Ultimately, the 
analytical concept of the arena allows us to point towards some the underlying reasons for the 
disappointing achievements of flood management in Senegal.  
  
3. Methodology   
The primary data collection took place in Dakar, Senegal, in November 2012 and from January to 
April 2013. Qualitative explorative and semi-structured interviews (113) and informal 
conversations were conducted by Caroline Schaer, at the national, municipal and community levels 
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in Dakar and in the two municipalities of Pikine/Dakar, Guinaw Rail Nord and Dalifort. 
Interviewees included representatives from ministries, national agencies and committees, 
semiprivate and private institutions, NGOs, experts international aid agencies, households, CBOs, 
municipal authorities, neighbourhood chiefs and religious leaders. Moreover, focus group 
discussions (7) with households and CBO members, supported by participatory diagramming 
methods, and attendance at public meetings also produced data. Interviews and focus group 
sessions were conducted with support from an interview guide, which was adapted to each 
category of respondent. These covered a wide range of issues, such as the views on the nature and 
effect of municipal, government and development actors' flood management approaches, flood 
impacts, governance configuration, trust, the history of activities, as well as the attitudes, 
perceptions and interactions among actors involved. At the municipal and community levels, most 
interviews were conducted in Wolof with a translator, while interviews at the national level were 
conducted in French. All interviews and focus group sessions were recorded and transcribed. The 
data was then coded (open and selective coding) and analysed with the aid of Nvivo software for 
qualitative analysis. The secondary data drawn on includes journal articles, grey literature (official 
reports and non-published reports gathered during interview sessions), an interpretative reading 
of the press, speeches and policy statements. Coding was also applied for secondary data analysis, 
where the data was coded with the help from the qualitative analysis software, according to i.e. 
concepts, approaches, theories and geographical contexts.   
  
4. Flood management interventions and policy in peri-urban Senegal   
Although sporadic government actions to assist flooded communities have been recorded as far 
back as 1962, when disaster victims from the village of Koungany received donations from former 
President Léopold Sédar Senghor (Dakar-Matin, 1962a; Dakar-Matin, 1962b), it was only under 
President Abdou Diouf (1980-2000) that floods became a recurring reality (in 1989 and between 
1994 and 1999) in rural as well as urban areas in Senegal. This section provides a chronological 
narrative of the most important interventions and policies applied within the domain of urban 
flood management in Senegal since 2000, starting under the first government to take power after 
the democratic transition, that of the Senegalese Democratic Party (Party Démocratique Sénégalais 
(PDS2)).   
  
4.1 Interventions and post-disaster relief (2000-2005)  
The initial communication of the first Council of Ministers under the PDS regime (2000- 2012), 
under  President Abdoulaye Wade, emphasized the need to find a permanent solution to flooding 
in underserviced peri-urban areas (Sénégal, 2000). The PDS’s stated commitment to addressing 
the problem of flooding gave hope to the populations affected (Thiam, 2013), who had thus far 
                                                 
2 For the sake of clarity the French acronyms are maintained in the text. Organisations and programmes names in 
French and acronyms are listed in Annex 1.    
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been left alone to deal with the challenges of living in underserviced flood-prone areas. The first 
manifestation of the government's commitment to address the problems encountered by residents 
in informal settlements was through the 'Restructuring and regularization of informal settlements 
policy (Politique de Restructuration et de Régularisation des quartiers spontanés (PRQS)). This 
policy was aimed at regularizing land tenure and restructuring infrastructure (electrification, roads, 
sanitation) in Pikine.   
The main intervention, termed the 'Irregular Pikine South' (Pikine Irrégulier Sud (PIS)) project, 
was implemented by the semi-private organisation, 'Right to the city Foundation' (Fondation Droit 
à la Ville’ (FDV)), and financed through a collaboration between the Government of Senegal, 
German cooperation bodies (GTZ and KFW) and the European Union. As a first step to 
regularizing peri-urban neighbourhoods, residents were offered a fifty-year right of occupation 
(droit de superficie) to replace the prevailing customary law (droit coutumier) under which they had 
acquired their property. However, as they had to pay for the plot, many residents did not see the 
benefit of regularising their ownership arrangements, and the illegal occupation (occupation irrégulière) 
of the land continued. The focus on restructuring was straightforward at the time, as the need for 
urban restructuration programmes (programmes de restructuration) to develop periurban areas with 
irregular settlements, thus solving the recurring flooding problems, has pervaded the discourses of 
the government and donors in respect of solutions to flooding in the country for years. 
restructuring programmes were perceived as a panacea for all difficulties facing flood-threatened 
areas by both the general population and public authorities alike. According to interviewees from 
the municipal development agency (ADM), who is the lead institution in charge of developing a 
master plan for storm-water management in flood prone zones, there were disparate 
understandings of what 'restructuring' entails, programmes often equated new roads with the 
rehousing of residents, while underlying issues such as sanitation and rainwater drainage were 
mainly approached on a small scale and in an ad-hoc manner.   
Another main intervention for flood disasters was initiated at the time, the 'National Relief 
Coordination Plan' (Plan National d'Organisation des Secours (Plan ORSEC)), which was directly 
the responsibility of the government. The ORSEC plan was (and still is) implemented by the 
Directorate of Civil Protection (Direction de la protection civile (DPC)), the formal national risk 
prevention and disaster management mechanism under the Ministry of Interior. The 'High 
Commission for Civil Protection' (Commission Supérieure de la Protection Civile (CSPC)), created 
in 1999, served as the advisory body for the Minister of Interior on civil protection issues and for 
the coordination of sectoral activities in disaster prevention and relief. The ORSEC plan has been 
initiated repeatedly since then as a contingency plan aimed at minimizing disaster risks, as well as 
organizing and coordinating the national disaster response. However, in practice initiatives 
implemented under the plan are to this day still mainly restricted to limited acute relief, such as 
water-pumping and channel-digging by the fire brigade and the temporary evacuation of affected 
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households to schools and/or military camps. The ORSEC plan is still under-resourced, and the 
means provided to fight flooding are considered derisory compared to the actual and acute needs 
of the population. In addition, several coordinating bodies for flood response were created, 
including the 'National Commission for the Management and Planning of Flooding' (Commission 
Nationale de Gestion Prévisionelle des Inondations (CONAGPI)) in 2001 and the 'National Unit 
for the Prevention and Fight against Flooding (CNPLI) in 2003, among others (see Table 1).   
The 'National Office for Sanitation' (Office National de l'Assainissement du Sénégal (ONAS))was 
created in 2003 upon the formation of the Ministry of Environment and Sanitation for the 
execution of tasks related to sanitation. These tasks were divided between ONAS and the 
Sanitation Directorate, which are to this day organized in the same manner. The Directorate is 
responsible for the formulation of policy, programmes and projects nationally, while ONAS’s main 
responsibility is the disposal of wastewater in the regulated areas of Dakar. To a large extent this 
excludes peri-urban areas and rainwater evacuation. ONAS is responsible for closed channels, 
while open channels are the responsibility of local municipalities, in spite of the limited resources 
they have to ensure maintenance and cleaning (ADEPT, 2010).  
As urban flooding gradually worsened between 2000 and 2005, isolated government programmes 
and projects were formulated with support from international and bilateral organizations, such as 
the 'Sanitation Programme for Peri-urban Areas' (Programme d'Assainissement des Quartiers Péri 
Urbains de Dakar (PAQPUD)), the 'Long-term Water programme' (Programme Eau à Long 
Terme (PELT) and the 'Millennium Sanitation and Drinking Water Programme' (Programme 
d'Eau Potable et d'Assainissement du Millénaire (PEPAM). In addition, numerous NGOs and 
international organizations have emerged in flooded municipalities over the years (see Table 3 in 
Annex) to provide affected populations with relief assistance and other support, many only to 
disappear again. Interventions were in general mainly restricted to rudimentary relief and smallscale 
initiatives such as the provision of motor pumps, the creation of water retention basins (often of 
insufficient capacity and posing safety risks in their own right) to capture the surplus of water, the 
construction of open channels for water evacuation, the provision of simple pipe systems and 
channels, and the distribution of food and non-food items. Some victims received monetary 
compensation for their resettlement.   
The general absence of programmes to promote a basic infrastructure adequate for flood 
management such as rainwater drainage and sanitation was, according to national experts, 
characteristic of a government approach whereby a request for international aid and limited 
immediate relief once the floods had become a reality was the preferred strategy. While 
government policy and donor interventions between 2000 and 2005 may be summarized as 
consisting of expensive and unsustainable seasonal and relief support and minor infrastructural 
improvements to flooded areas, from 2005 their emphasis was on the policy of social housing.   
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4.2 Housing construction policy (2005-2008)  
Disastrous floods changed the electoral calendar in 2005 when President Wade postponed 
parliamentary elections allegedly to save the 52 billion Francs Communauté Financière Africaine 
(FCFA) allocated to the elections and divert them to help flood-affected victims through a new 
policy of social housing construction3. Parliamentary elections were then planned to be coupled 
with the presidential elections of 2007, though ultimately they were not. Quite the opposite, the 
costs of the postponed elections increased substantially, and the government was accused of 
having taken them from the funds that had been collected and earmarked for the new policy of 
social housing construction (Thiam, 2013). The policy entailed the permanent relocation of 
households living in some of Pikine's high-risk areas. It was implemented under the ‘Jaxaay Plan’ 
(Plan Jaxaay) and the 'One Family, One House' programme, initially under the National Agency 
against Floods and Slums (ANLIB), which had been taken over by the Ministry of Architectural 
Heritage, Housing and Construction. The objective of these interventions was to compensate the 
worst affected households for the loss of their houses by constructing 4000 new houses in a new 
location (the ‘Cité Jaxaay’), as well as building retention ponds and gravity-based drainage systems.   
  
These interventions came under heavy criticism from many camps. First, they were alleged to have 
been poorly conceived technically. Being a prototype of responses to irregular settlements and 
flooding, ironically the ‘Cité Jaxaay’ did not benefit from a proper sanitation system and adequate 
rainwater evacuation drainage, and experienced flooding itself in 2010, 2011 and 2012.  Secondly, 
the programme was subject to accusations of fraud, and civil-society critics and current 
government representatives both saw it as a pretext for the former government to postpone 
elections and to collect significant funding, while relocating only a negligible number of affected 
households (Senegal Post, 2014). Unsurprisingly, some members of the PDS, now in opposition, see 
these criticisms as a political move by the present president, Macky Sall, to harm them (Le Soleil, 
2013). In addition, the resettlement strategy turned out to be too expensive at the time of 
realization, as well as inadequate in view of the extent of the damage sustained and the number of 
victims, according to national experts in the field.   
  
4.3 Decentralisation and the first post-disaster needs assessment (2008-2012)  
From 2008 to 2012, policies, plans and interventions to address urban flooding were repeatedly 
formulated, many of them to be abandoned soon afterwards, such as the 'National Contingency 
Plan', which was validated in 2008, but has never been implemented. s. By the same token, some 
of the projects formulated before this period have never been carried out. For example, the 'One 
Family, One House' programme was initiated in 2006 but never materialized; the project in support 
of the 'National Disaster Prevention, Reduction and Management Programme' was formulated in 
                                                 
3 The new policy consists of resettling people displaced from flood zones into houses which are constructed and 
subsidized by the state. Beneficiaries pay 15% of the value of the house over a period of fifteen years.  
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2011, but nobody has heard anything about it since then. Similarly, platforms and committees 
established to address urban flooding have proved to have a short life-span. For example, the 
'National Platform for the Reduction of Major Disaster Risks' (Plateforme Nationale pour la 
Réduction des Risques Majeurs de Catastrophe (PNRRMC)), which shares the same role as the 
CSPC and was established in 2008, in line with HFA recommendations, was no longer operational 
in 2012.   
  
According to interviewees from flood prone areas, experts and government officials, this period is 
characterized by the strong unpopularity of the regime in power, partly due to their poor 
management of floods, the misuse of the funds allocated to the ‘Plan Jaxaay’ being a key issue of 
popular discontent. The unpopularity of the government culminated in violent demonstrations in 
peri-urban municipalities where floods had been recorded and a reversal for the political majority 
by the opposing coalition, 'Benno Siggil Senegaal' (BSS) (united to rebuild Senegal), who won the  
municipal elections  in  March 2009. The voting percentage in Pikine was at its lowest (15%) for 
these elections, which is by experts (Thiam, 2013) and residents of Pikine mainly attributed to the 
government's poor management of floods.   
  
In spite of the derisory human and financial resources available to municipalities in order to  tackle 
floods this task was decentralized by Wade’s government after the BSS opposition coalition came 
to office in the major urban agglomerations of the country. The BSS coalition’s attempts to live 
up to the promises it had made during municipal elections turned out to be just as short-term and 
fragmented as the approach followed by the former power-holders, consisting mainly of water 
pumps, sewage pumping, and temporary channel digging.   
  
Following the 2009 floods, the 'Post-Disaster Needs Assessment' (PDNA), funded through the 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) by the World Bank and the 
Government of Senegal, estimated the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs and costs in Dakar 
at more than 204.5 million USD.4 The report identified a number of priority measures, which 
included (1) preparing a master plan for storm-water management, (2) establishing a system for 
storm-water drainage in priority areas in Pikine and (3) preventing and mitigating disasters by 
developing an urban development plan (GFDRR et al., 2014). In order to implement these priority 
measures, a 'Rainwater Management and Climate Change Adaptation Programme' (Projet de 
Gestion des Eaux Pluviales et d'Adaptation au Changement Climatique (PROGEP)) was initiated 
by the government’s 'Municipal Development Agency (Agence de Développement Municipal 
(ADM))5 with support from the World Bank, the Nordic Development Fund and the African 
                                                 
4 40.7 million USD for rehabilitation and 163.8 million USD for reconstruction and disaster risk reduction. 5 The 
ADM was created in 2009 by the Government of Senegal in collaboration with donors in order to support 
decentralisation processes.   
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Development Bank (AfDB) (République du Sénégal  2011), in peri-urban areas of Dakar. The aim 
of the programme is to integrate flood risks in urban planning, improve urban planning conditions 
and construct an extensive drainage system, based on the master plan for rainwater drainage (Plan 
Directeur de Drainage des Eaux Pluviales (PDDEP-2011), in collaboration with the 'National 
Agency for Investment Promotion of Large Scale Construction' (Agence des Grands Travaux 
(APIX)) , while reinforcing the institutional capacity of the actors operating in this area.   
  
4.4 A new regime and a ten-year flood management programme (2012)                                                        
In 2012 exceptionally high rainfall was seen across West Africa, which resulted in deadly floods in 
the capital of Senegal, where 26 people lost their lives. Residents took to the streets of the capital 
to denounce the government for failing to act on the floods. In response, the newly appointed 
President Macky Sall (from the Alliance Pour la République (APR) party) promised that the money 
reserved for the Senate would instead be allocated to a new Ten Year 'Flood Management 
Programme' (Plan Décennal de Gestion des Inondations (PDGI) 2012-2022), in order to support 
flood victims. Members of Parliament voted to abolish the Senate, and the post of vice-president 
was eliminated by Congress, although no one had held the position since it had been created in 
2009 by former President Abdoulaye Wade. It is unclear how much of the money set aside for the 
Senate was actually diverted to the implementation of the PDGI. The PDGI consists of an 
emergency phase and a ten-year programme to develop infrastructure for the evacuation of 
rainwater through an unprecedented drainage system; it is being implemented by the ADM in 
collaboration with the ONAS, with support from the World Bank. Implementation of the PDGI 
has been planned in detail, with costs totalling 720 billion FCFA in 2022, and it is currently being 
implemented. There is still a lack of clarity over the distribution of roles for implementing the 
diverse components of the PDGI and some insecurity as to future funding, which is mobilized 
annually. Moreover, the focus is mainly on rainwater evacuation, the provision of comprehensive 
sanitation not being included. Allocations for the 2012 floods amounted officially to 66 billion 
FCFA, while the total costs of the PDGI amounts to 720 billion FCFA. Allocations for flood 
management thus went from 2 to 66 billion FCFA between 2000 and 2012. During the 2012 
floods, in addition to new external aid (from France, Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest 
Africaine (UEMOA), Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and World Bank 
among others), the largest amount of televised fundraising and largest private donations to date 
were registered, but unfortunately the allocation of the funds collected created controversy, as they 
were first earmarked for the Ministry of Interior in charge of the DPC, which is responsible for 
the implementation of the ORSEC Plan, and were later allocated to the Ministry of Finance. 
Whether the funds have been used for the planned purposes is still an issue of public dispute (Fall 
and Diedhiou, 2013). As is the case for most disbursements and the spending of public emergency 
funds, procedures are complex and lengthy and lack transparency (GFDRR et al., 2014).   
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The new regime of President Macky Sall created a ministry exclusively for the management of 
flood zones, the 'Ministry of the Restructuring and Development of Flood Zones'5 (Ministère de 
la Restructuration et de l’Aménagement des Zones d’Inondation (MRAZI)), which was supposed 
to consolidate the national response to floods. With the stated objective being to promote 
sustainable flood management through effective prevention, the development of sustainable 
solutions and the resettlement of flood victims, the creation of the new Ministry was presented as 
an expression of the government’s commitment to reorganizing the failed flood response and to 
assign floods to a specific government organ. However, the reality turned out to be disappointing. 
The MRAZI did not manage to define its role clearly before it was replaced in July 2014 by the 
Ministry of Restructuring and Reclassification of Suburbs6 under the authority of the Ministry of 
Urban Renewal, Housing and Living Environment. The new Ministry’s stated attempt at achieving 
synergy between stakeholders scattered throughout the complex field of flood management 
focuses mainly on the reorganization of municipalities that are prone to flooding by means of 
social housing construction programmes. During the 2013 floods the President revealed a new 
public housing construction program ('Yakaar City'), a prolongation of the failed Plan Jaxaay. The 
Yakaar City programme was partly delivered during the 2014 rainy season, disregarding residents 
from previously flooded sites in Guédiawaye, Médina Gounass and Djeddah-Thiaroye-Kao, where 
flood victims have been waiting to be resettled since 2005 (under Plan Jaxaay). The role played by 
the Fondation Servir le Sénégal (a foundation lead by Marième Faye Sall, the wife of President 
Macky Sall) in the relocation of residents and the ORSEC plan has become the subject of extensive 
criticism and debate in the press, because of the lack of transparent funding allocations and the 
alleged influence of party politics in its activities.  
  
5. Discussion  
The analysis of the configuration of flood management policies and programmes in urban Senegal 
depicted above points to three key intertwined issues, which have influenced the limited 
achievements within the domain of flood management in urban areas. These include, but are not 
restricted to, the political and personal appropriation of flood management-related processes, the 
reinforcement of the dichotomy between central government and municipalities, and a fragmented 
institutional framework, with overlapping and competing institutions.         
  
5.1 Political and personal appropriation of flood management processes   
The account of flood management interventions in Senegal illustrates the significance of the 
political appropriation of the flooding issue. This appropriation is visible through a number of 
momentary periods of symbolic activity in the arena of national politics. One example was the 
                                                 
5 Décret n° 2013-163 du 25 janvier 2013.  
6 Décret n°2014-899 du 22 juillet 2014.  
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postponing of parliamentary elections and the abolition of the Senate. These symbolic acts were 
linked to major flood events and were claimed to be in support of the disaster-stricken population. 
However, rather than such acts of support, they could be seen as ways of holding on to political 
power in a difficult political situation and of weakening the opposition, which had a  
majority in the Senate. The Plan Jaxaay, which was only partly financed by the savings made from 
postponing the parliamentary elections, was promoted in the media not only as a technical and 
sustainable solution to the issue of flooding, but almost as a personal gift from the President to 
the ruling party. The likely substantial misuse of funds and the fact that in reality they only reached 
a very limited percentage of those who were in need, indicate that the main purpose of the Plan 
Jaxaay was to make the government’s commitment concretely visible prior to the elections and 
thereby increase its popularity. In other words, politicians were not only seeking for the most 
appropriate solutions to address the flooding issue, they were mainly using a symbolic disaster 
response in order to influence their prospects of re-election.   
  
Another example of symbolic activity in the arena of national politics was the creation of the 
Ministry for Floods (as MRAZI was baptized in everyday language) by the new regime in power 
under President Macky Sall. Although presented as an expression of the government’s dedication 
to solving the recurrent flood issue, the creation of the new ministry was more symbolic than 
followed by tangible actions. The Ministry’s assignment decree was limited in scope and included 
mainly the Social Housing Construction Programme to Prevent Slums (PCLSLB), previously 
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Water. MRAZI did not manage to define its role clearly 
or set an agenda within the field of flood management before it was closed. With its limited 
mandate and lack of achievements, MRAZI thus proved to be a short-lived political response to a 
structural and institutional problem, which nonetheless allowed the government to demonstrate a 
strong national commitment to resolving the floods issue, without dedicating sufficient resources 
to tackling the core of the problem.  
  
The examples above were related to the arena of national politics, but as we shall see below, access 
to international donor funding constitutes an important arena for the exclusion of political rivals 
at various political levels. The positioning and negotiations in the arena of donor funding are 
complex due to poorly formalized and mainly ad hoc flood management mechanisms and 
coordination processes. As a result, actors from opposition parties risk being excluded from access 
to and control over external funds. One example of political exclusion concerns the World Bank-
financed PROGEP programme, which was started prior to the presidential elections in 2012. In 
the PROGEP programme observers considered the Regional Development Agency (Agence 
Régionale de Développement (ARD)) and the Regional Council of Dakar (CRD) to be important 
and relevant stakeholders in the process, but nevertheless they were finally excluded from the 
negotiating table and piloting committee (Mane, 2011). While there might be several reasons for 
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this, most observers see this as a matter of politics because the two excluded institutions were 
headed by the opposing coalition (Alliance pour les Forces du Progrès). Other examples of such 
party-political exclusions are found across all levels of governance (see section 5.2).   
  
As a result of the political and personal appropriation of flood management resources and 
processes and the lack of achievements within the domain of flood management, a certain fatigue 
and lack of concern in this area are widespread among the actors involved, as well as widespread 
suspicion and accusations, as articulated by an expert who has been involved in the design and 
implementation of several government-led flood management initiatives: 'In fact there are people from 
the government and others, who do not want this matter (flooding) to end, they don't want lasting solutions. It's like 
in war, if the war ends, I don’t' sell my arms anymore, I lose my job, I have no work, I'm not paid, I don't manage 
anything, I don't have my billions anymore'. The populations affected by floods and the many actors 
involved in flood responses at the national and municipal levels suspect that flood management 
interventions are being diverted from their original purpose of supporting victims in order to fulfil 
diverse political and personal interests. This fosters considerable rumours about the practises 
attached to interventions at multiple levels and interventions are thus in deficit of legitimacy from 
the very outset. In addition to the poor results of flood management, suspicions regarding the 
political and personal appropriation of funds are fuelled by the inoperative and non-formalised 
coordination mechanisms, the limited documentation of fund disbursements and use, and the 
opacity surrounding the roles of some of the actors involved, according to actors involved in the 
implementation of national flood risk mitigation interventions and experts. The relatively short 
time span of many project and programmes and the insecure mobilization of annual funds for 
longer term programmes such as the PDGI points in the same direction. The prevalence of 
accusations and suspicions undermines the creation of minimal relations of confidence and trust, 
which are central to the satisfactory delivery of floodrelated interventions and services. According 
to  Olivier de Sardan (2009), this is a general phenomenon one can observe with respect to the 
delivery of public and collective services in francophone West Africa.   
  
Consistent with the actor-oriented perspective applied here (Olivier de Sardan, 2005), the example 
from the national arena of politics, illustrate that flood management interventions and  processes 
followed in Senegal are political and social in nature, with actors using the opportunities created 
by interventions to serve their own interests and priorities. Interventions as  socially constructed 
and negotiated processes (Long and Ploeg, 1989), which is found to be key to understanding the 
limited accomplishments within the domain, is not captured in the conventional linear thinking 
behind ideal-type donor intervention, where problems may be identified and followed by suitable 
actions, which together result in foreseeable outcomes (Mosse, 2004). These findings support 
those of Bang (2014) and Thiam (2013), who reveal how government administrations in West 
Africa use disaster management interventions as symbolic actions to promote their positions 
during election campaigns.   
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5.2 Reinforcement of the dichotomy between central government and municipalities  
According to expert interviews, conflicts over the attribution of responsibility for flooding, for 
addressing impacts and for channelling support have long prevailed between national government 
and decentralised municipalities. This conflict was exacerbated in 2009, when the Benno Siggil 
Senegal (BSS) opposition coalition was elected to govern the major cities of the country over 
former President Abdoulaye Wade’s party. This had an impact on flood management because 
these cities had experienced recurrent flooding and because municipalities run by the opposition 
party were penalized by being allocated derisory financial, physical and human resources to fight 
floods. In a number of cases, the most serious aspect was the decision to devolve responsibility 
for flood management from national government to local municipalities, without the allocation of 
new general funding. The governmental resources earmarked for municipalities through the Fonds 
d’équipement des collectivités locales and the Fonds de dotation de la decentralisation was already 
minimal and inadequate for most municipalities, and not sufficient for the new flood management 
obligations.  Observers therefore saw this measure of decentralization as a general penalty imposed 
on the major cities run by the opposition.   
  
In addition to the general penalization of opposition-run municipalities described above, the post-
2009 period also provide examples of how specific municipalities were favoured according to their 
political affiliations. For example, according to expert interviews, the mayor of the municipality of 
Thiaroye sur Mer,  who was affiliated to the Senegalese Democratic Party in power, received 
substantial support from the central government, while the mayor of Dalifort, who was from the 
opposition socialist party, was completely neglected. The party-political interference from central 
government in the management of municipal affairs is nothing new and has been practised by 
various governments. It began during the socialist era under President Senghor (1960-1980), where 
public drinking fountains were installed according to the political affiliations of the neighbourhood 
delegates ('délégués/chefs de quartier') to whom they were awarded (Salem, 1992). The same 
methods were observed by the former Prime Minister, Souleymane Ndiaye Ndéné, who in 2009 
visited flooded areas and allocated the sum of FCFA 10,000,000 to municipal officials from the 
PDS party while neglecting officials from the opposition.    
  
As a result of the exclusion of the political opposition described above, municipal-level actors 
struggle to define and defend their own positions through individualized transformations of 
processes and personalized strategies. This was the case for a Pikine mayor, who revealed his 
special advantage in using his personal networks in the DRR coordinating framework, to tap into 
municipal flood response support and access support from the ORSEC plan for his municipality:  
'I hear other mayors complaining about their needs, but in my case my needs are taken care of by the Orsec program. 
I have special relations with the leaders of the (ORSEC) plan, I know whom to go to if I need something, I have 
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networks everywhere'. Or when the president of the coordination agency for community-based work 
in the Pikine municipality of Guinaw Rail Nord explained that he had to use informal channels to 
access information from which he was excluded regarding the flood management plans for his 
area. These alternative appropriations of flood management processes co-exist with the formal 
procedures, mandates and plans laid out for flood management at multiple levels, in, for example, 
the High Commission for Civil Protection (CSPC) and coordinating bodies such as the National 
Platform for the Reduction of Disaster Risk (PNRRMC).   
  
As described above, the negotiation of both inclusion in and exclusion from flood management 
processes and arenas takes place across distinct levels of governance and is fuelled by the 
significant aid provided to the national level, which rarely trickles down to the municipal level. 
These processes are part of a more general phenomenon described by Reisnick (2014) in which 
vertically divided authority, i.e. opposition parties entering office at the municipal level,  are 
perceived as a threat to service delivery at the municipal level. As has been shown, the struggle for 
resources and influence between the state centre and peripheral municipalities over flood 
interventions is found to reinforce existing dichotomies between state and municipality, 
interventions being used as vehicles for political projects, as described also by Lund (2007) in 
different contexts. It is thus not always the most appropriate or competent actors who are involved 
in interventions, but those who have most influence over the processes in their respective arenas.   
  
The example from flood management in Senegal shows that the relationship between national 
government and decentralised municipalities is key to understanding the configuration of flood 
risk management in Senegal. Consistent with the actor-oriented perspective applied here (Long 
and Ploeg, 1989; Bierschenk, 1988; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (1997)), the unequal positions 
of influence of state actors at the different levels of governance and the resulting diverging interests 
and conflicting motives they hold, is found to have direct implications for how flood management 
interventions have been approached in the country, where the prospects for municipalities to play 
an actual role in addressing floods are marginal.  
 
5.3 Institutional fragmentation and overlaps   
The narrative in section 4 shows that numerous coordinating mechanisms, institutions and 
ministries have been created and restructured, seemingly without a concerted government vision, 
and often to comply with international policy frameworks (such as the HFA) or at the request of 
international development partners. Policies and plans have often been formulated in isolation 
from one another, with little horizontal integration. Accordingly, the coordination of flood 
management takes place separately within the respective sectors, by new institutions put in place 
without dissolving the old ones, and often with short lifetimes.   
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The shifting and unsuccessful designations of a coordinating body for flood response management 
listed in Table 1 demonstrates this process of putting new institutions in place without disbanding 
old ones. In 2001, the National Commission for the Management and Planning of Flooding 
(CONAGPI) was established. In 2003, the similar National Unit for the Prevention and Fight 
against Flooding (CNPLI) was instituted. In 2004, a National Unit for Flood response is created, 
followed by the establishment of the National Committee on Flood Prevention, Supervision and 
Monitoring (CNPSSLI) in 2007. In 2008 the National Platform for the Reduction of Disaster Risk 
(PNRRMC) was set up at the request of development agencies  to be coordinated by the Prime 
Minister's office. It is supposed to be an advisory and consultative body for all stakeholders 
involved in disaster risk management, including flood management policies and programmes, but 
has hardly been operational since its creation.   
  
Coordination Mechanism Designation   Role   Year  
  
Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC)   Coordination of national flood 
response and national relief 
organisation Plan (Plan 
ORSEC)    
1999  
National Commission for the Management and 
Planning of Flooding  (CONAGPI)  
Implemented but not operational  2001  
National Unit for the Prevention and Fight against 
Flooding (CNPLI) under the Ministry of Interior   
Implemented but not operational  2003  
National Unit for Flood Response  National response and coordination;  
food aid and hygiene kits    
2004  
National Committee on Flood Prevention, 
Supervision and Monitoring  (CNPSSLI)  
Flood prevention and preparedness   2007  
National Platform for the Reduction of Disaster Risk 
(PNRRMC)  
Coordination of disaster risk reduction 
activities; follows Hyogo Framework of 
Action (HFA) recommendations   
2008  
National Flood Prevention Office (ONPI)   
  
Coordination of storm water drainage 
management   
2012  
National Flood Committee (NILC)   Coordination of the implementation of 
action plans resulting from the national 
strategy  
2009  
Table 1. National flood management coordination mechanisms in Senegal.    
Another example of institutional overlap is the establishment of MRAZI as described in section 
4. In this case an overlap between MRAZI’s mandate and other ministries already involved in 
flood management (see Table 2 in Annex 2) merely augmented the disorder and competition 
among government actors.   
  
On the other hand this situation, where institutions with different purposes intersect and even 
change into one another, creates different layers of influence and legitimacy, which co-exist in the 
same socio-political space. According to representatives from development agencies, NGOs, semi-
18  
  
 
 
private agencies and state institutions, this generates confusion as to their roles and responsibilities, 
since their reciprocal interrelations and fields of competence are inadequately defined and poorly 
formalized, This is observable, for example, in the case of the DPC, which, in spite of its formal 
role, never managed to play a leadership or coordinating role with respect to flood response in 
Senegal. To this day the general coordination of policies, programmes and projects related to flood 
management has not been attributed to the DPC, or any of the other coordination mechanisms, 
but has been dispersed among several ministries (such as the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of 
Family and Solidarity, Ministry of Habitat, Water), agencies (i.e. ADM), decentralised actors (local 
municipalities), and private and semi-private companies (i.e. FDV, the Sanitation Office of Senegal 
(ONAS)), with very limited coordination among them and scattered mandates and prerogatives. 
The ambiguity entailed by these practises has led to competition between disaster responses, 
duplicate mechanisms and the ongoing ‘negotiation’ over competencies and interpretations of 
mandates in the domain of flood management in Senegal. In the absence of clear mandates and 
binding documents in the domain, this also creates inertia at the highest political level, according 
to government agents and expert.    
  
The practice of confusing mandates and piling up institutions can be seen partly as the result of 
the political and personal appropriation of the flood management processes described in section 
5.1, and partly as the result of numerous fragmented donor interventions. As we have seen in this 
case, and as has been illustrated by the seminal work of James Ferguson (Ferguson, 1994), donor 
interventions tend to create new structures and institutions so that they can keep control over their 
own resources, but also because donor interventions have the resources to create new institutions, 
while on the other hand alone being in a position to recommend abandoning old ones. Leading to 
the same result, individual and institutional actors will try to position themselves in new arenas and 
propose new organisational structures in their struggle for material and symbolic resources.  
  
The piling up of institutions described here, which is found at the national level in Senegal, has 
also been established for flood management processes at the local level in peri-urban Senegal, 
where the local state is found to be negotiated and translated differently through a number of 
diverse formal and informal actors (Schaer and Hahonou, forthcoming). The findings presented 
here also resonate with a wider body of literature concerning West Africa documenting how 
institutions, mainly at the local level, pile up, overlap and intersect in contexts which enjoy a high 
level of donor support (Bierschenk et al. 2000; Nygaard, 2008).   
  
6. Conclusion   
This article has investigated how floods have been managed in urban Senegal during the last fifteen 
years and asked why it has not led to the results expected by the population, state institutions and 
the donor community. The paper has provided a narrative of the most important interventions 
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and policies applied within the domain of urban flood management in Senegal since 2000, starting 
under the first regime in power after the democratic transition, that of the Parti Démocratique 
Sénégalais (PDS).   
  
This was followed by an analysis of the configuration of flood management policies and 
programmes, which points towards three interconnected issues that have influenced the limited 
achievements within the domain of flood management in urban areas. First, the political and 
personal appropriation of flood management processes is found to be a practice creating a culture 
of rumours, distrust and apathy among the actors involved in flood management. Secondly, the 
reinforcement of the existing dichotomy between central government and decentralised 
municipalities, where party politics is used strategically to marginalize peripheral actors from the 
opposition, has reduced the resources applied to flood management. Lastly, a  
fragmented institutional framework with overlapping institutions, duplicate mechanisms and an 
ongoing ‘negotiation’ of competencies and interpretation of mandates has limited the impact of 
flood management in Senegal.   
  
 While the explanatory structural and historical factors for scarcities in service provision in urban 
and peri-urban centres (Gandy 2006; Nunan and Satterthwaite 2001; Resnick 2014b; Resnick 
2014a.) and the disaster risk reduction measures that have been adopted in the region (Diagne and 
Ndiaye 2009; Gaye and Diallo 1997; Diagne 2007) have been the object of analysis, limited research 
has examined the governance mechanisms, institutions and actors involved in urban DRR and 
CCA in the region (see Bang 2014; Thiam 2013). By applying an actor-oriented perspective, the 
article goes a step further by showing that actors involved in policy and flood intervention 
processes are competing in coexisting arenas around flood management, to access municipal flood 
response funding, to attract disaster risk management and climate adaptation resources to the 
country, to influence the direction of policy and to encourage popular support to political parties. 
Consequently, because of the limited resources available for governments such as the Senegalese, 
development funding for disaster risk management and climate adaptation in the domain of urban 
flooding is found to be an important part of the solution to dealing with repeated flooding. 
Paradoxically, as exposed in this paper, it is also a part of the problem. The 'commodity' approach 
to flood management engendered by substantial development funding produces and legitimises 
certain practises and interests, which may work against the very objectives of flood management 
interventions. While this has been described by several authors locally (Lewis and Mosse, 2006; 
Smith, 2006; Bierschenk et al., 2000; Bierschenk, 1988), relatively little work has exposed this issue 
nationally, a theme to which this article forms a contribution. The findings presented here convey 
the need for a more profound understanding of the contextual processes, interests and 
mechanisms behind disaster risk management and climate change interventions in general and 
flood management in particular, so that interventions can meet both the current and future 
challenges of a changing climate.   
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Annex 1: Acronyms  
ADM   Agence de Développement Municipal  
AFDB   African Development Bank  
AGR   Agence Régionale de Développement  
ANAMS   Agence Nationale de la Météorologie du Sénégal  
ANLIB   Agence nationale de Lutte contre les Inondations et les Bidonvilles  
APIX   Agence des Grands Travaux  
APR   Alliance Pour la République   
BNSP   Brigade Nationale des Sapeurs Pompiers  
BSS   Benno Siggil Senegal (united to rebuild Senegal)  
CAP   Cellule d'Appui Psychologique   
CCA   Climate Change Adaptation  
CNPLI  Cellule Nationale de Prévention et de Lutte contre les Inondations  
CNPSSLI   Commission Nationale de la Prévention, de Supérvision et de Suivi de la Lutte contre les 
Inondations  
CONAGPI Commission Nationale de Gestion Prévisionelle des Inondations   
CSPC   Commission Supérieure de la Protection Civile   
CRD   Conseil Régional de Dakar   
DPC   Direction de la Protection Civile  
DRR  Disaster Risk Reduction  
ECOWAS   Economic Community Of West African States  
FCFA  Franc Communauté Financière Africaine  
FDV   Fondation Droit à la Ville  
GFDRR   Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery   
HFRA   Hyogo Framework for Action   
IAGU   Institut African de Gestion Urbaine  
MRAZI   Ministère de la Restructuration et de  l’aménagement des zones d’inondation  
ONAS  Office National de l'Assainissement du Sénégal  
ONPI  Office National de Prévention des Inondations.  
ORSEC   Plan National d'Organisation des Secours  
PAQPUD   Programme d'assainissement des quartiers péri urbains de Dakar  
PCLSLB   Programme de construction des logements sociaux et de lutte contre les banlieues  
PDDEP   Plan Directeur de Drainage des Eaux Pluviales  
PDGI   Plan Décennal de Gestion des Inondations   
PDNA   Post Disaster Needs Assessment  
PDS   Parti Démocratique Sénégalais   
PELT   Programme Eau à Long Terme   
PEPAM  Programme d'eau potable et d'assainissement du millénaire Programme   
PIS  Pikine Irrégulier Sud project  
PNRRMC:  Plateforme Nationale pour la Réduction des Risques Majeurs de Catastrophe  
PRQS:        Politique de Restructuration et de Régularisation des quartiers spontanés  
PROGEP:  Projet de Gestion des Eaux Pluviales et d'Adaptation au Changement Climatique  
UEMOA:   Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine  
UNISDR:   United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction  
 Annex 2: Main actors involved in urban flood management in Senegal  
   
Sector    Area of responsibility    Year of 
creation  
Ministry of 
Interior  
High Commission of Civil  
Protection (CSPC)  
  
Coordination of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 
activities  
Advise Ministry of Interior on DRR issues  
1999  
Directorate of Civil 
Protection (DPC)   
Coordination of National Relief Organisation 
Plan (Plan ORSEC)    
1999  
National Brigade of  
Firefighters (BNSP)    
Organisation of Emergency Relief & 
implementation of ORSEC plan  
1964  
Directorate for National  
Police  
  
Traffic, information and security management in 
the context of flooding  
2009  
Ministry of  
Health  
Directorate of Medical  
Prevention (DPM)  
  
Medical prevention, community health   2005-2009  
  
Directorate of Public Hygiene   
(DHP)  
Implementation of hygiene and public health 
policy  
  
1996-2004  
Cellule d’Appui  
Psychologique (CAP)  
Psychological assistance to flood victims  2005  
Ministry of  
Urban  
Development 
and Housing  
(MUH)  
MUH's urban planning missions and land use control are at the heart of flood 
management: construction norms, use of land, urban planning and development.  
(Décret n° 2004-84 du 23 janvier 2004)  
  
  
  
2006  Plan Jaxaay Directorate   Construction of water retention basins  Housing construction for flood victims  
Ministry of  
Economy and  
Finance  
Municipal Development 
Agency (ADM)   
Support decentralisation process  
Funds an emergency action plan for optimizing 
pumping of storm water drainage (2010) 
Implements PROGEP    
2009  
Ministry of 
Water and  
Sanitation  
National office for sanitation  
(ONAS)  
Implementation of construction projects, 
rehabilitation and maintenance of drainage 
systems   
1996  
Sanitation department   
  
Responsable for the Directory Plan for rain water  
Drainage (PDDEP)  
2011  
National Agency against  
Floods and Slums (ANLIB)  
Housing restructuring and control of new 
settlements   
April 2006 
to Mai 2006  
Directorate for Water  
Resource Management and  
Planning (DGPRE)  
Studies on water resources, inventory , planning and 
water ressource management  
2004  
Ministry in 
Charge of 
Restructuring 
and  
Managing  
Flood Zones  
(MAZRI)  
National Flood Prevention  
Office (ONPI)   
  
Responsible for construction and social housing  
program to prevent slums (PCLSLB)  
Initiates PCDI    
  
Coordinates the management of storm water drainage 
systems   
2012-2014  
National Flood Committee  
(under Ministry of housing 
and construction then 
Ministry of Water and  
sanitation in 2012, then  
MRAZI in 2013)  
Table 2: Ministries involved in urban flood management in Senegal  
  
Table 3: Main organisations involved in urban flood management in Senegal  
 
Institution Area of responsibility  Year 
Semi- public,  
and private 
organisations  
National Agency for Investment Promotion 
of large scale construction (APIX) 
Large scale infrastructure construction (highway) 
Implements part of the rainwater drainage component 
of PROGEP  
2007 
'Droit à la Ville' foundation (FDV) Restructuring plans, regularisation fonciere des 
quartiers irréguliers  
1994 
National Agency of Meteorology of Senegal 
(ANAMS )  
Implementation of government meteorology policy   2002 
National Agency of Statistics and 
Demography (ANSD )  
Collection of statistical data ; economic, socio- 
economic studies, 
2005 
Société Nationale des Télécommunications 
du Senegal (SONATEL) 
Telecommunications, involved in ORSEC plan 1996 
Cleaning and Hygiene Agency (APROSEN) Public Cleansing Activities, collection, transport, 
processing / recycling and disposal of solid waste 
2005 
National office for low-cost  housing 
(ONHLM) 
Social Housing for flood victims 2006-
2013 
SONES & Sénégalaise  des Eaux (SDE) Water utilities 1996 
AGEROUTE Road works utility 2010 
Cap Vert Real Estate Company (SICAP) Housing construction and planning of development 
areas to support flood victims. 
2007 
National Society of Electricity in Senegal 
(SENELEC) 
Electricity access 1998 
CETUD Urban transportation 1997 
 
Bilateral and 
multilateral  
organisations 
and NGOs 
 
World Bank  Financing of major flood management programmes, 
plan and assessment reports (PDNA, PROGEP, 10 
year Plan) 
2010-
2015 
The European Commission with support 
from Italy, Luxembourg, France, Sweden, 
Germany 
Humanitarian aid through various United Nations 
system offices 
2009 
Islamic Investment Bank Support of emergency operations by providing 
assistance to populations 
2009 
United Nations organisations (WFP, 
UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, UNDP, OCHA) 
Support in achieving the MDGs and relief and 
recovery support to flood victims 
2009-
2015 
International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
Coordinate and direct relief operations during natural 
disasters - Responding to emergencies 
1960 
Adaptation Fund Financial support for adaptation projects and 
programs on climate change 
2011 
Red Cross Training of volunteers, capacity building and 
assessment of vulnerability and capacity.  
since 
1960 
Germany  support through the International Federation of Red 
Cross Societies and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
2009-
2011 
UK Building Resilience and adaptation to climate extremes 
and disasters (BRACED) programme 
2014 
NGOs: International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent societies (IFRC),  
SOS Children Village, Christian Relief 
Services' (CRS) Islamic relief France,  ATD 
Quart Monde, World vision Senegal, 
CARITAS, OXFAM GB, EVE, IAGU, 
ENDA, ACI, IUCN, GREEN Senegal, 
Medicos del Mundos, Plan Sénégal, Secours 
Islamique Francais, Terre Nouvelle Suisse, 
Water Aid, World Vision 
Flood mitigation, relief and recovery support, capacity 
building, research   
 
NGO Council in support of development 
(CONGAD)  
 
Support actors to integrated disaster risk reduction and 
management in Local Development  
2000 
